RED TEAM OPERATIONS REPORT: STATIC FORENSIC ANALYSIS (ANDROID)
Operators: Red Team Lead & Tactical Operator Objective: Android Logical Image (Target Dump) Tools: FTK Imager, SQLite (CLI/Browser), ALEAPP...
Operators: Red Team Lead & Tactical Operator Objective: Android Logical Image (Target Dump) Tools: FTK Imager, SQLite (CLI/Browser), ALEAPP Estimated time: 1 hour
1. INTRODUCTION AND MISSION OBJECTIVES
Sección titulada «1. INTRODUCCIÓN Y OBJETIVOS DE MISIÓN»In this phase, we will analyze a disk image (or evidence folder) from a compromised device. Our goal is not just to "find the flag," but to understand the user's persistence and communication methodology.
We will divide the operation into three attack vectors:
- Structural Exploration (FTK Imager): Filesystem navigation.
- Data Mining (SQLite): Manual queries to native databases.
- Automated Intelligence (ALEAPP): Rapid event correlation.
2. VECTOR 1: STRUCTURAL EXPLORATION WITH FTK IMAGER
Sección titulada «2. VECTOR 1: EXPLORACIÓN ESTRUCTURAL CON FTK IMAGER»We will use FTK Imager to mount the evidence as if it were a local disk and navigate without altering the metadata (software-based write-blocking).
2.1 Device Identification (Fingerprinting)
Sección titulada «2.1 Identificación del Dispositivo (Fingerprinting)»The first task is to identify the victim.
- Path:
/system/build.prop - Procedure:
- Open FTK Imager -> Add Evidence Item -> Image File (or Folder if it is a logical extraction).
- Navigate to the folder
system. - Export or view the file
build.prop. - We look for the line
ro.serialno.
- Objective: Note the serial number.
2.2 Software Enumeration (App Inventory)
Sección titulada «2.2 Enumeración de Software (App Inventory)»We need to know what is installed to detect exfiltration vectors.
-
Path:
/data/system/packages.xml(orpackages.list) -
Procedure:
- Locate the file
packages.xml. - Open it with a text editor or XML browser.
- We look for the
<package>tag that has the most recentlastUpdateTime(it is a Unix timestamp).
- Locate the file
-
Objective: Identify the last installed package.
SELECT number, durationFROM callsORDER BY duration DESCLIMIT 1;
We must follow these steps to ensure we are analyzing the evidence effectively. We will be able to visualize the device data and understand how the compromise occurred. Then, we will proceed to data mining and automated intelligence to obtain more information.
3. VECTOR 2: DATA MINING WITH SQLITE (CLI & GUI)
Sección titulada «3. VECTOR 2: MINERÍA DE DATOS CON SQLITE (CLI & GUI)»Android stores 90% of critical information in SQLite databases. We will extract these files with FTK Imager and analyze them locally.
3.1 Messaging Intelligence (SMS)
Sección titulada «3.1 Inteligencia de Mensajería (SMS)»-
Artifact:
/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/databases/mmssms.db -
Action: We will export the
.dbfile to our desktop. -
Query (SQLite Studio / CLI): We will search for a hidden “flag” in the message body.
SELECT address, date, bodyFROM smsWHERE body LIKE '%flag%';If it does not appear with “flag”, we will manually review the latest messages.
-
Artifact:
/data/data/com.android.providers.contacts/databases/calllog.db -
Action: We will export and analyze.
-
Query to find the maximum duration:
SELECT number, durationFROM callsORDER BY duration DESCLIMIT 1;(Note: Duration is usually in seconds).
3.3 Social Graph Analysis (Contacts)
Sección titulada «3.3 Análisis del Grafo Social (Contactos)»- Artifact:
/data/data/com.android.providers.contacts/databases/contacts2.db - Action: We will export and analyze the
dataorraw_contactstable. - Mission: We will look for the “suspicious” contact list.
- Procedure:
- We will open the
datatable. - We will filter by the
mimetype_idcolumn that corresponds to “name” (it is usually 7, but varies). - We will sort alphabetically or by
_id. - We will identify the penultimate name that looks suspicious (codewords, hacker aliases, etc.).
- We will open the
3.4 Browsing Intelligence (Chrome Forensics)
Sección titulada «3.4 Inteligencia de Navegación (Chrome Forensics)»-
Artifact:
/data/data/com.android.chrome/app_chrome/Default/History(Note: the file is namedHistorywithout an extension, but it is a SQLite). -
Action: We will export and open it with SQLite Browser.
-
Mission: We will find data upload locations (exfiltration sites).
-
Query:
SELECT url, title, last_visit_timeFROM urlsWHERE url LIKE '%upload%' OR title LIKE '%upload%'ORDER BY last_visit_time DESC;We will look for URLs such as mega.nz, drive.google, anonfiles, etc.
3.5 Bluetooth Configuration
Sección titulada «3.5 Configuración Bluetooth»- Artifact: It is usually an XML or CONF file, not always a DB.
- Path:
/data/misc/bluedroid/bt_config.confor/data/misc/bluetooth_manager/. - Procedure: We will open it with a text editor (Notepad++ / VS Code).
- Objective: We will look for the
Namefield within the[Adapter]section. This is the device's visible name.
4. VECTOR 3: AUTOMATION WITH ALEAPP
Sección titulada «4. VECTOR 3: AUTOMATIZACIÓN CON ALEAPP»To speed up the process and corroborate manual findings, we will deploy ALEAPP (Android Logs Events And Protobuf Parser).
4.1 Execution
Sección titulada «4.1 Ejecución»- We will open ALEAPP (GUI or CLI).
- We will select the folder where we have dumped the image/evidence.
- We will process and generate the HTML report.
4.2 ALEAPP Report Analysis
Sección titulada «4.2 Análisis del Informe ALEAPP»- Exfiltration Package:
- We will go to the Installed Apps section.
- We will look for package names related to file transfer (e.g.,
com.dropbox,mega.privacy,com.termux, FTP/SSH tools). One of them is the key.
- MMS and Malicious Web:
- We will go to the MMS section (different from SMS).
- MMS can contain parts (parts table) with text or images. We will look for a message containing a URL. This website is the attack vector.
- The User “Encrypted User”:
- We will return to the Contacts section.
- We will look for the contact with the Display Name “Encrypted User”.
- We will look at the adjacent columns to find the email field.
4.3 Artifact Analysis (Downloads)
Sección titulada «4.3 Análisis de Artefactos (Downloads)»Finally, ALEAPP or FTK Imager will show us the content of /sdcard/Download/.
- Mission: Sensitive PDF document.
- Action:
- We will extract the PDF from the
Downloadsfolder. - We will open it.
- We will read the content to obtain the final flag.
- We will extract the PDF from the
5. SUMMARY OF COLLECTED EVIDENCE
Sección titulada «5. RESUMEN DE EVIDENCIAS RECOLECTADAS»At the end of this session, we will have recorded in our report:
- Serial Number (System).
- Last App installed (Timeline).
- SMS Flag (Hidden data).
- Longest call duration (Behavior).
- Penultimate suspicious contact (Social Graph).
- Last upload URL (Intent).
- Bluetooth name (Device Info).
- Exfiltration package (App Analysis).
- Web in MMS (Network Indicator).
- Encrypted user email (Attribution).
- PDF Flag (Payload).
End of analysis report.

