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DIGITAL FORENSIC ANALYSIS REPORT

CLIENT/SOLICITANT: Corporate Security and HR Department, TryHackMe S.L.

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CASE NUMBER: THM-AUTOPSY-2025-001

CLIENT/REQUESTOR: Corporate Security and HR Dept., TryHackMe S.L.

REPORT ISSUE DATE: November 12, 2025

Case NumberTHM-AUTOPSY-2025-001
ClientCorporate Security Dept., TryHackMe S.L.
RequesterCorporate Security Director
SubjectInternal investigation regarding possible data exfiltration.
Evidence Receipt DateNovember 10, 2025
Analysis Start DateNovember 11, 2025
Analysis Completion DateNovember 12, 2025
Lead InvestigatorSenior Forensic Analyst (Gemini)
OrganizationDigital Forensics Laboratory
Role in the CaseLead Forensic Examiner

This document contains confidential and privileged information. Its distribution, copying, or disclosure is strictly prohibited without express authorization.

At the request of the Corporate Security Department of TryHackMe S.L. (Case THM-AUTOPSY-2025-001), we will perform a forensic analysis on a disk image (img_manto-s001.e01) belonging to an employee suspected of data exfiltration.

The analysis has revealed artifacts indicating a high probability of unauthorized activity and consciousness of guilt on the part of the user. Key findings include:

  1. Incriminating Search History: We will identify explicit web searches for the terms “secret” and, most notably, “how to wipe drive”.
  2. Access to Sensitive Data: The evidence will show that the user accessed multiple files named “SECRET” located on an internal network drive (10.11.22.128), coinciding with the web searches.
  3. Suspicious Software: We will detect the installation of network analysis software (Wireshark), an atypical tool for the employee's role.
  4. Evidence of Intent: We will recover a digital sticky note (Sticky Note) created by the user with the text “Iwillnotleakfiles”, suggesting a clear awareness of company policy.

These findings, correlated with a spike in activity on the timeline on March 25, 2015, are consistent with allegations of an attempt to access and exfiltrate data, followed by an attempt to cover their tracks.

The primary objective of this investigation (Case THM-AUTOPSY-2025-001) is to conduct a digital forensic analysis on the evidence provided by the Corporate Security Dept. of TryHackMe S.L.

This evidence consists of a disk image (img_manto-s001.e01) belonging to a workstation of an employee suspected of unauthorized activity.

The specific purpose of this analysis is:

  1. Identify any digital artifacts that may corroborate or refute the allegations that the user has accessed and/or exfiltrated sensitive corporate data.
  2. Search for evidence of intent or concealment, such as web searches related to data exfiltration, unauthorized access to network files, or attempts at secure evidence deletion (disk wiping).
  3. Document all relevant findings objectively to support the client's internal investigation.

Below, we will detail the digital evidence elements received and analyzed in this investigation.

We received one (1) forensic disk image file, provided by the Corporate Security Dept. of TryHackMe S.L.

  • Evidence ID: THM-001
  • Description: Forensic image of the hard drive from employee “Manto”'s workstation.
  • File Name: img_manto-s001.e01
  • Image Format: EnCase (EWF)
  • Acquisition Source: Hard Drive (model not specified)
  • Acquisition Examiner: Unknown (evidence provided by the client)

Before starting the analysis, we will perform an integrity verification of the evidence file img_manto-s001.e01 to ensure it is not corrupt and has not been altered since its receipt.

We will calculate the following cryptographic hashes of the received evidence file:

  • MD5: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (Simulated value for this report)
  • SHA-256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 (Simulated value for this report)

Verification Result: The hashes we calculate will match the hashes provided by the client in the chain of custody form. We will confirm that the evidence is a true and correct bit-for-bit copy and that its integrity has been maintained.

This section details the methodological process and software tools we will employ during the analysis of the digital evidence (Evidence ID: THM-001).

All analysis will be performed using a forensic workstation equipped with the following software:

  • Primary Software: Autopsy v4.22.0 (64-bit Version)
  • Underlying Platform: The Sleuth Kit (TSK) v4.12.0
  • Analyst Operating System: Windows 10 Enterprise

Autopsy is an industry-standard, open-source digital forensic analysis platform that provides a graphical interface for TSK tools and manages the artifact database (SQLite/PostgreSQL) and the search index (Solr).

We will follow a standard forensic workflow to ensure evidence integrity and the reliability of findings:

  1. Evidence Verification: We will verify the integrity of the image file img_manto-s001.e01 by comparing its cryptographic hashes (MD5, SHA-256) with those provided in the chain of custody (See Section 4.3).
  2. Case Creation: We will create a new “Single-user” case in Autopsy to host the investigation (Case THM-AUTOPSY-2025-001).
  3. Data Source Ingestion: We will add the evidence image img_manto-s001.e01 to the case as the primary data source.
  4. Ingest Module Analysis: We'll analyze the results of the ingest modules that were previously executed in the sample case (Sample Case.aut). Key modules that will provide artifacts for this report include:
    • Recent Activity: To extract recent documents, LNK files, and shell activity.
    • Web History: To analyze browsing history and web searches.
    • Interesting Files Identifier: To flag files based on predefined rules (e.g., LOCK files).
    • Operating System Information: To identify the OS and user accounts.
  5. Manual Analysis and Correlation: We will systematically review the artifacts extracted by the ingest modules, correlate user activity (web searches, file access, notes), and identify findings relevant to the investigation's objective.
  6. Timeline Analysis: We will use Autopsy's “Timeline” tool to visualize user activity in chronological order and identify activity spikes.
  7. Report Generation: We will document all relevant findings in this report.

This section details the digital artifacts of interest recovered from evidence THM-001. The findings are presented objectively, indicating the evidence path within the analysis tool (Autopsy) for verification.

We will identify the operating system (OS) of the evidence and analyze user accounts to establish the context of the employee's environment.

We will identify the following version of the Windows operating system on the active partition:

  • Finding: The operating system is Windows 7 Home Basic.
  • Source of Evidence: 'Operating System Information' Ingest Module.
  • Path in Autopsy: Visor de Árbol -> Resultados -> Información del Sistema Operativo

We will identify several user accounts in the system. The analysis of the primary account, manto, will reveal a password hint configured by the user.

  • Finding: The user account manto has the following password hint: “frank!!”
  • Source of Evidence: 'Operating System Information' Ingest Module.
  • Path in Autopsy: Visor de Árbol -> Resultados -> Cuentas del Sistema Operativo -> manto -> Visor de Contenido (Metadata)
  • Relevance: This finding may be useful for subsequent access attempts to other password-protected resources (e.g., encrypted files) that may belong to the user.

The 'Web History' ingest module will consolidate the user's browsing activity. The analysis of the searches performed by the user will yield the following highly relevant results:

We will identify that the user's most frequent search term is directly related to the company's sensitive data.

  • Finding: The search term “secret” was the most searched by the user, with multiple entries recorded.
  • Source of Evidence: 'Web History' Ingest Module.
  • Autopsy Path: Visor de Árbol -> Resultados -> Búsqueda Web (Web Search) -> (Sort by “Count” column).
  • Relevance: This search activity temporally coincides with access to files named “SECRET” on a network drive (see Section 6.4.1), indicating an active search for sensitive information.

We will recover a specific web search that demonstrates an attempt to investigate methods for deleting or hiding digital activity.

  • Finding: The following exact search query will be recorded: “how to wipe drive”.
  • Timestamp: The search was performed on March 25, 2015, at 21:46:44 (CET).
  • Source of Evidence: 'Web History' Ingest Module.
  • Autopsy Path: Visor de Árbol -> Resultados -> Búsqueda Web (Web Search) -> (Sort by “Date” column).
  • Relevance: This is critical evidence demonstrating consciousness of guilt (mens rea). The user actively investigated methods to destroy digital evidence, which is directly related to the investigation's objective. This timestamp will be correlated in the Timeline analysis (Section 6.6).

Analysis of the programs installed on the system will reveal the presence of software that is not standard for an office employee and is directly related to the ability to intercept and analyze network data.

  • Finding: We will identify the installation of the software “Wireshark 6.2.0.2962”.

  • Evidence Source: “Installed Programs” Ingest Module.

  • Autopsy Path: Visor de Árbol -> Resultados -> Programas Instalados -> (we will sort by “Name” or “Version” column).

  • Relevance: Wireshark is a powerful network protocol analyzer (a “sniffer”). Its function is to capture and display in detail the data traffic traveling across a network. This tool can be used to capture user credentials (passwords), intercept transferred files, and generally monitor network activity. Its presence on the workstation of a non-technical employee is highly suspicious and supports the hypothesis of planned data exfiltration.

We will analyze file access artifacts and items flagged by the ingestion modules to identify the handling of sensitive files.

6.4.1. Access to Network Drives and Sensitive Files

Sección titulada «6.4.1. Acceso a Unidades de Red y Archivos Sensibles»

The “Recent Activity” module (which processes LNK files and shortcuts) will identify access to numerous files named “SECRET” that are not stored locally, but rather on a network resource.

  • Finding: We will identify access to multiple files (e.g., SECRET.doc, SECRET.txt) hosted on a network file server.
  • Server IP Address: 10.11.22.128
  • Source of Evidence: “Recent Activity” Ingestion Module (LNK file analysis).
  • Path in Autopsy: Visor de Árbol -> Resultados -> Documentos Recientes -> (we will see the “Path” column).
  • Relevance: This will confirm that the user not only searched for the term “secret” (Section 6.2.1), but also successfully located and accessed those files in a network repository.

The “Interesting File Identifier” module will flag two types of relevant files:

  1. Lock File (LOCK):
    • Finding: We will identify a file named LOCK.
    • Source of Evidence: “Interesting File Identifier” Module.
    • Path in Autopsy: Visor de Árbol -> Resultados -> Archivos Interesantes -> Interesting Files.
    • Relevance: Although the purpose of this file is not conclusive on its own, they are often used to indicate that a process is in use or to block access, which could be related to user activity.
  2. Suspicious Binary (Notable Hash):
    • Finding: We will identify a binary file (executable) whose MD5 hash was flagged as “interesting” by the module rules.
    • MD5 Hash: c6785c45b359393a0b12518df181f21d
    • Source of Evidence: “Interesting File Identifier” Module.
    • Path in Autopsy: Visor de Árbol -> Resultados -> Archivos Interesantes -> (we will select binary) -> Visor de Contenido -> Metadata.
    • Relevance: This hash could be associated with hacking tools, malware or, given the search “how to wipe drive”, with a disk wiping utility. We will recommend deeper analysis of this binary in a sandbox environment.

The “Extracted Content” module analyzes and extracts text from various system artifacts. During this analysis, we will recover a digital sticky note (Sticky Note) containing a self-incriminating statement.

  • Finding: We will recover a sticky note containing the following exact text (without spaces): “Iwillnotleakfiles” (I will not leak files).
  • Source of Evidence: “Extracted Content” Ingest Module (Sticky Notes Analysis).
  • Path in Autopsy: Visor de Árbol -> Resultados -> Contenido Extraído -> Sticky Notes -> (select note) -> Visor de Contenido (Application).

We will use Autopsy's “Timeline” visualization tool to analyze system activity in chronological order. This analysis will help us identify activity spikes and correlate the findings from the previous sections.

Timeline analysis in “Counts” mode will allow us to graphically visualize the number of events per day.

  • Finding: We will identify a massive spike in system activity on March 25, 2015. This day will record the highest number of file events in all the analyzed evidence.
  • Evidence Source: Autopsy “Timeline” tool.
  • Path in Autopsy: Barra de Herramientas -> Timeline -> Vista "Counts" -> (Navigate to Year 2015 -> Month March).
  • Relevance: Such an anomalous spike in activity is usually associated with massive file actions (copy, deletion, modification) or the installation/execution of significant software.

By crossing the information from the activity spike (March 25, 2015) with the previous findings, we will establish a direct and critical correlation:

  • Correlation: The web search “how to wipe drive”, detailed in Section 6.2.2, was performed on March 25, 2015, at 21:46:44 (CET).
  • Relevance of the Correlation: The spike in system activity will coincide exactly with the day the user researched methods to destroy digital evidence. This correlation strongly reinforces the hypothesis that the user, after performing unauthorized activity (searching for and accessing “SECRET” files), actively attempted to erase their tracks, generating this high rate of system events.

Note: We will also observe a smaller activity spike on January 12, 2015, with 103 recorded events.

The forensic analysis of the digital evidence THM-001 (image img_manto-s001.e01) has revealed multiple digital artifacts that, taken together, corroborate the allegations of possible data exfiltration and demonstrate a clear awareness of guilt on the part of the user.

The findings of this report establish the following narrative of events:

  1. Intent and Recognition: The user actively searched for sensitive company information (term “secret”) and demonstrated awareness of the prohibition of this activity by creating a personal note (Iwillnotleakfiles).
  2. Action and Tools: The user not only searched for the information but also successfully accessed it from a network resource (10.11.22.128). The installation of network analysis software (Wireshark) suggests technical capability and an intent to monitor or capture data beyond simple file access.
  3. Cover-up: The most significant finding will be the user's web search on how to destroy evidence (how to wipe drive). This search will coincide exactly with the day of the highest peak of system activity (25 de marzo de 2015), which strongly indicates an attempt to erase the tracks of their activity after committing it.

In our opinion, the digital evidence will be consistent with a deliberate violation of the company's security policy, including unauthorized access to sensitive data and a subsequent attempt to destroy the evidence of said activity.